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This paper aims to define and set the goals of what it calls a ‘Critical 
Hermeneutics of Populism’. Starting with the diagnosis of the ascent of 
rightwing populism being directly tied with the democratic legitimation 
deficit and the social problems caused by neoliberal policies, it assesses 
populist phenomena through the lens of hermeneutics. It argues that 
populism is not an entirely irrational phenomenon and that in spite of 
some common features of its intrinsic logic, substantive differences ex-
ist between left (or progressive) political proposals and their rightwing, 
exclusionary counterparts. The paper claims that only an assessment 
of the discourses, values, and practices put forward by each political 
proposal that can be dubbed ‘populist’ will reveal its perils and prom-
ises, and help distinguish which types of populism are lethal to liberal 
democracy, and which can actually help to deepen it. Finally, it argues 
that given the interpretative and potentially transformative features of 
Hermeneutics, a Critical Hermeneutics of populism might be the ap-
proach providing us with the best tools to operate such distinctions.  




There is hardly a more urgent matter for social and political theory 
today than tackling the newfound force of populism. My aim in this 
paper is to lay the ground for what could be called a critical hermeneu-
tics of the various, widespread phenomena of populism. But this begs 
an explanation. First, here I am using critical hermeneutics as applied 
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to a social phenomenon, that of populism. As I have argued before 
(Marcelo, 2012), following Walzer (1987), the method of interpretation 
is not confined to textual hermeneutics in a strict sense, and can rather 
serve as a toolbox for social theory, insofar as we can argue for its 
superiority if compared to what Walzer calls the methods of ‘discovery’ 
or ‘invention’. Second, as I shall explain below, ‘critical hermeneutics’ 
as is understood here should be taken as a specific type of Critical 
Theory and so its goals, like in other strands of Critical Theory in the 
Frankfurt or closely related traditions, are taken to be both interpreta-
tive and emancipatory. Third, similarly to other critical exercises such 
as those prone by post-Kantian philosophy, the use of ‘critique’ entails 
a certain type of judgment, whose outcome is a distinction between 
different occurrences of a given phenomenon, some of which might be 
deemed legitimate, while others will not, and this according to the cri-
teria laid out for what will be a sound response to a given problem. 
Against this backdrop, the first section of the paper will briefly 
recall the specificity of populism as a political logic, according to Laclau 
(2005). This will serve as a reminder that populism is not necessarily, 
as it were, a totally ‘irrational’ phenomenon; quite the contrary, popu-
lism exists because of specific reasons, and it possesses an inner rea-
son itself, to which Laclau precisely calls ‘populist reason’ (2005); un-
derstanding it is key to make a certain path with populism before 
grasping which populist phenomena must be fought and which might 
actually be a part of a democratic society or a ‘good’ society, to use a 
thick concept. 
In the second section, against the backdrop of a recapping of the 
purpose of a Critical Theory of society, and the definition of hermeneu-
tics as an intrinsically emancipatory project (following Vattimo and Za-
bala, 2011) the paper briefly spells out the tasks of a Critical Herme-
neutics. In order to do so, a concise historical analogy will be made: 
much like the first generation of Frankfurt critical theorists took it as 
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an integral part of their task to understand the rise of Fascism through 
an analysis of the authoritarian personality (Adorno et. al, 1950; see 
also Horkheimer, 1947) and the fascination it exerted on the collective 
psyche of those times, so today we need to grasp the implicit and ex-
plicit causes behind the rise of populism, albeit perhaps with new tools. 
This is not tantamount to overextend the analogy and to implicitly 
claim that we are living today something exactly akin to what happened 
in the 1930s or that every populist movement or proposal can be 
dubbed ‘fascist’; but it does entail that populism is today begging a 
critical understanding and response, much like Fascism and Nazism did 
in the 1930s.  
The third section assesses what to some might seem counterintu-
itive: a theoretical proposal aiming to justify political movements that 
might arguably be described both as ‘populist’ and ‘progressive’, i.e., 
what Chantal Mouffe proposes to call a ‘leftwing populism’. This third 
section will also build on something shown in the in the first section: 
populism is not the only problem facing democratic societies and pro-
gressive political options, as we also have to deal with the conse-
quences of decades of neoliberal policies. Finally, my very brief conclu-
sion glimpses at what lies ahead for this attempt at a critical herme-
neutics of populism. 
 
2. People, Popularity, Populism 
What makes populism so popular? And how do we define it? Is there a 
way to really understand it? The answer to these questions hinges on 
some specific wagers. To start with, and even though one often evoked 
striking feature of populism is its use of affects, the starting point of 
any attempt to interpret populism needs to be a refusal to reduce it to 
a purely irrational phenomenon. Second, it must also acknowledge the 
existence and pertinence of something such as ‘collective identities’ 
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including the construction of a ‘people’. And while this might seem ob-
vious, at least in the social sciences, it does entail going beyond meth-
odological individualism, which has been prevalent in social theory for 
decades. 
This is not to say that ‘the people’ is or can be a unified phenom-
enon, and to believe it is so is misguided; this is one important limita-
tion of many theories of populism, as in their attempts of devising an 
agonistic strategy of hegemony, they might forget that every collective 
identity has to acknowledge and respect plurality, both internally and 
externally. 
Be that as it may, populism is becoming increasingly popular. In 
this section I mostly rely on Laclau’s (2005) account of populism, be-
cause it makes the wagers I just evoked. But to understand what is 
driving this popularity we have to take a glimpse at the context in which 
this is happening. There is a reason why populism often appears in 
pejorative fashion, as some sort of scapegoat concept. It is because it 
runs counter to the political mainstream. But how has this political 
mainstream fared in the public eye in these last few decades? Let us 
just take some examples of our Northern Atlantic context. 
After the fall of the Berlin wall and the demise of the Soviet Union, 
something happened within mainstream economic policy and politics. 
The acceleration of the globalization processes was in fact determined 
by what has come to be (also pejoratively) defined as neoliberalism. 
Mouffe (2018) describes the success of neoliberalism, led by the polit-
ical figure of Thatcher, as nothing short of a revolution, in that in suc-
ceeded in creating a new hegemony, with a new language and new 
frontiers of what was deemed politically acceptable: thus the T.I.N.A. 
(There is No Alternative) discourse. According to Mouffe, it was no sur-
prise that Thatcher admitted ‘Tony Blair’ and the ‘New Labour’ had 
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been her ‘greatest achievements’, because what the neoliberal revolu-
tion did was to ‘force [their] opponents to change their minds’ 
(Thatcher, quoted by Mouffe, 2018: 64). 
What this means is that with the so-called ‘third way’ politics, the 
left basically accepted, to great extent, the terms and the policies that 
were imposed by increasingly deregulated market capitalism; both in 
Western Europe and the US, we witnessed a rise both in income ine-
quality and the precarization of labor, while this abandonment of the 
mainstream leftwing parties of sharper critiques of capitalism and the 
dismantling of the old social democratic consensus that once led to 
strong Welfare states (especially in Europe) was a key factor in what 
is sometimes described as a ‘crisis of representation’ in Western de-
mocracies. Over the course of the past few decades more and more 
people felt disenfranchised and no longer represented by traditional 
political parties. And while the economic expansion of the 1990s helped 
to conceal this phenomenon, it eventually burst out into the open with 
the subprime crisis – later transformed in the Eurozone’s sovereign 
debt crises affecting the peripheral countries with weaker economies – 
and the worsening of the social situation in many countries. 
This paved the way for the growth of populism. Appealing to the 
discontentment of all those who felt outside of the political mainstream, 
movements coalescing around charismatic leaders and who more often 
than not put forward simple proposals to complex problems were able 
to broaden their base of supporters. Now, all of this would not in itself 
be a problem, were it not for the substantive content of the proposals 
advanced by these populist movements. Indeed, and mainly in 
rightwing populist parties, what we see is the multiplication of enemies 
and a growth of racism, xenophobia and hate speech which is, in itself, 
unacceptable in liberal democracies. 
However, the lack of rigor with which the concept of ‘populism’ 
appears in the public sphere, and is mostly derided (in its many forms, 
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or even in all its forms) by the so-called ‘elite’, including not only by 
traditional mainstream parties but also by what has been dubbed the 
‘liberal bubble’ actually has a perverse effect. It is true that right-wing 
populism thrives on an anti-intellectual stance; but to automatically 
disqualify all populist forms as being ‘irrational’ and the populist base 
as being made up of ‘deplorables’ (to quote the way in which Hilary 
Clinton once referred to Trump supporters during the Presidential cam-
paign in 2016) is detrimental, as it fuels the anger of all those who feel 
misrepresented, while it also conceals the failure of the ‘establishment’ 
to tackle the social problems brought about by neoliberal policies, and 
that fanned the flames of the populist appeal in the first place. 
This is the reason why I argued before (Marcelo, 2018) that rather 
than demonizing ‘populism’ in all its forms, we should make an effort 
to tackle the social problems leading up to it, while also striving to 
distinguish between the substantive content of the values of proposals 
of each ‘populist’ movement. While it might be tempting to adopt an 
analysis reminiscent of Arendt’s take on Totalitarianism, arguing that 
on both sides of the ‘populist spectrum’ we have the same phenomena, 
this would also be a partial and misleading interpretation of our current 
political predicament. Arguing that Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez, Podemos or Syriza on the left, and Trump, Bolsonaro, Farage, 
Orban, Salvini and all the other authoritarian or proto-authoritarian 
leaders on the right are two sides of the same coin, and to reject these 
altogether as demagogues, and their bases as deplorable idiots easily 
manipulated and unable to grasp that only ‘liberal’ solutions are worth-
while, is missing the fundamentals of the current political shift away 
from the center. 
I thus argue (Marcelo, 2018) that rather than simply drawing the 
line between ‘populist’ and ‘mainstream’ political movements and uni-
laterally rejecting the former, we should assess their values and the 
substantive content of their proposals, thus making them undergo 
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what I propose to call a ‘critique of populist reason’ aiming to discern 
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of ‘populist reason’ (Laclau, 
2005). If we take up such a task, we might very well discover that 
some progressive ‘populist’ proposals might actually be welcome to re-
new democracy and tackle the crisis of representation, and that the 
line of demarcation between what is legitimate or illegitimate could 
very well be drawn in the values that liberal democracies can or cannot 
accept. And it goes without saying that hate speech or the multiplica-
tion of the figures of the enemy within an exclusionary logic is some-
thing that we cannot accept. 
What is, then, the intrinsic fundamental logic of populism? Accord-
ing to Laclau it is ‘the very logic of constitution of political identities’ 
(Laclau, 2005: 19). But these are taken to be ‘differential identities’ 
(69), that is, they are relationally constituted, the locus of a ‘failed 
totality’ or an ‘irretrievable fullness’ (70). For Laclau, populism is the 
key to understand politics ontologically, given that it is these construc-
tions of a ‘people’ that reveal the inherently contingent nature of every 
political formation. Within populist logics, totality remains relevant, but 
it is seen ‘as a horizon, not a ground’ (71). Filling what Laclau calls the 
‘empty signifier’, each particular group tries to form an ‘incommen-
surable universal signification’, and it is to this that he calls the consti-
tution of a ‘hegemony’ (Ib.). 
In order for this process of will-formation to take place, Laclau 
contends that a chain of ‘popular demands’ be articulated, to form a 
broad social subjectivity. It is important to note that unlike in main-
stream political theory, this understanding of politics and democracy is 
anti-essentialist and agonistic. Democracy is here not seen as the tech-
nocratic management of a community through its administrative pow-
ers (Ib.: X) that somehow capture the political choices given to people; 
rather, the ‘essential non-fixity’ (Mouffe, 2018: 158) of social agents 
and social institutions resides in the fact that ‘every order is predicated 
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on the exclusion of other possibilities (156) and, therefore ‘things could 
have been otherwise’ (Ib.), also because every order can be challenged 
by counter-hegemonic practices ‘which attempt to disarticulate it in 
order to install another form of hegemony’ (ibid.). 
Now, as Mouffe (2018) makes clear, one of the main challenges 
of this vision of democracy, which refuses to reduce it to the placid 
management of the res publica and, on the contrary, recognizes an 
intrinsic conflictual character in it, rather than the sole search for con-
sensus, is to keep it at an agonistic (struggle between adversaries) 
level, preventing it from becoming properly antagonistic (struggle be-
tween enemies) (161). In Mouffe’s words:  
 
The agonistic confrontation is different from the antagonistic 
one, not because it allows for a possible consensus, but be-
cause the opponent is not considered an enemy to be de-
stroyed but an adversary whose existence is perceived as le-
gitimate. Her ideas will be fought with vigour but her right to 
defend them will never be questioned (161–162). 
 
This brings us to a very important conclusion, emphasized by 
Mouffe, and to which we will come back in our third section. The fact 
that the connection between liberalism and democracy is contingent, 
and even that liberal democracies have, in recent decades, made sig-
nificant concessions to neoliberalism, and been the cause of social ills 
and democratic misrepresentation, should not lead us to reject liberal 
democracies altogether. Instead, they should be cherished and re-
newed. 
Mouffe’s conclusion is that the crucial issue in a liberal-democratic 
regime is ‘how to establish this we/they distinction, which is constitu-
tive of politics, in a way which is compatible with the recognition of 
pluralism’ (161). That is, we have to acknowledge this agonistic aspect 
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of politics, as it is revealed by populism, while also cherishing the plu-
ralism without which liberalism is impossible and no just social order 
can exist. 
And this is one of the points in which the menace of right-wing 
populism becomes clear, given that it tries to squash pluralism and 
minorities as it diabolizes the other and scapegoats him or her in a 
manner that is offensive and violating of Human Rights. 
But how can we then respond to this with an analysis that tries to 
grasp the complexity of this problem while also making a contribution 
to tackle it? I believe this begs for the development of a critical her-
meneutics of populism. 
 
3. A Critical Hermeneutics of Populism 
There are many theories of populism. And even though many fall short 
of trying to provide an overarching definition of it (an ambition that 
Laclau does not shy away from), most do tend to reject it as an entirely 
negative phenomenon. Running counter to that tendency, I believe we 
should be able to distinguish which ‘populist’ proposals are acceptable 
in our democratic process and which should be utterly rejected. I al-
ready indicated in the previous section some of the features that should 
guide this process. But let us now turn to the type of theory that seems 
suitable to be up to that task. 
Several questions arise concerning this choice. Why a ‘Critical Her-
meneutics’ of populism? Why does such a theory need to be ‘critical’ 
and what does the qualification ‘hermeneutics’ add to the several 
strands of Critical Theory that can be applied to populism? 
Building on an earlier work (Marcelo, 2011) I contend that herme-
neutics is the best method to ‘make sense’ of the social. First, because 
we need a theoretical toolbox that is sensitive to history and to the 
nuances of the many traditions that make up the complexity of our 
societies and the several different traditions within it. Traditions that 
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are not automatically justified by their mere existence, but should not 
be considered completely irrational either – rather, they have to pass 
the ‘critical test’ but before they do, if they are to be understood, they 
should be reconstructed in the terms that make them reasonable for 
the social actors that take part in them to adhere and stick to them as 
their traditions, partly constituting the collective identities in which 
they recognize themselves. 
Second, hermeneutics brings with it a distinctive methodological 
attitude. Michael Walzer (1987) talks about three possible paths for 
social criticism: invention, discovery and interpretation. Invention 
adopts a constructivist method, trying to procedurally determine the 
best values or rules to implement in order to make a just society (e.g. 
Rawls); discovery takes an essentialist approach to those values and 
rules, trying to find them in some sort of transcendent predetermined 
order, thus granting an ontological foundation to social orders and find-
ing their grounding elsewhere (e.g. Plato); while interpretation, on the 
other hand, argues that the values and rules that guide societies are 
to be found in those same societies, and that if we are to exert moral 
and social criticism to that social reality in order to flesh out the values 
and rules that ought to guide it, we will find them in that very order; 
so they do not need to be discovered, or invented, just interpreted. 
Finding new, better interpretations of them is somehow just what we 
need to guide our practices or to bring them closer to the ideals we 
already have. 
Consequently, as we can see, hermeneutics does not take a foun-
dationalist approach to social reality. It is not a naïve realism and it 
does not need to appeal to objective truth standards outside of it, even 
though it is not purely relativist either – rather, hermeneutical truth is 
made up of a plurality of different interpretations and the process of 
perspective enlargement that is to be done through the adoption of 
certain sets of criteria. With its interpretative nature, hermeneutics is 
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midway between the descriptive and the normative (a position that 
Laclau [2005: 3] argued is the one of ‘populism’ too, which is a case in 
point for the adequacy of a hermeneutical method to grasp and assess 
populist phenomena), in that in the descriptions it puts forward we find 
entangled evaluations that implicitly or explicitly resort to values, as is 
characteristic of the hermeneutic circle. 
Third, and even though this qualification might seem counterintu-
itive for many, I want to build on Gianni Vattimo’s and Santiago Za-
bala’s (2011) claim according to which hermeneutics can be seen as 
having a ‘progressive’ nature. Indeed, many progressive thinkers have 
in the past tended to snub hermeneutics given the fact that many of 
the prominent hermeneuticians tended to be conservative (a word well 
applied to describe Gadamer; Heidegger is of course a more problem-
atic case, given his anti-Semitism – but this does not mean, of course, 
that his philosophy should be rejected altogether because of that). But 
Vattimo and Zabala refuse to see in hermeneutics a conservative pro-
ject. 
On the contrary, they consider hermeneutics to be anti-conserva-
tive, almost by definition. Insofar as hermeneutics is a post-metaphys-
ical project, insofar as it aims to go beyond Being as presence and be 
an alternative to purely descriptive and naïve objectivistic thought 
dominated by the paradigm of the natural sciences (unlike, Vattimo 
and Zabala claim, analytic philosophy) hermeneutics is a transforma-
tive endeavor. 
If this assessment is correct, then, it might turn out that herme-
neutics is not only one more theory dealing with populism, not only 
one more method applied to social theory but rather the standpoint 
that might reveal itself to be the most adequate to solving this prob-
lem. Why? Because it belongs to a ‘politics of interpretation’ with eman-
cipatory goals (Vattimo and Zabala, 2011: 76). On the one hand, it is 
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committed to a deep interpretation of existing practices – not to shun-
ning them altogether or close them in the domain of the ‘unthinkable’ 
or the ‘irrational’. But, on the other, it ‘is committed to overcoming 
institutionalized conventions, norms and beliefs and certainly not to 
accepting existing practices’ (Ib.). 
We see, then, that for Vattimo and Zabala hermeneutics is in itself 
political (77). Accordingly, they see in hermeneutics not only the em-
phasis on the plurality of interpretations but also a rejection of the 
conservative nature that they see in descriptive philosophies, in favor 
of action (Ib.). For them, hermeneutics is a potent tool against the 
bearers of power, and thus has an emancipatory and revolutionary po-
tential. In their framing of hermeneutics as a form of ‘weak thought’, 
they rebrand it as also being ‘the thought of the weak’, i.e., a force 
pushing for change (96). 
Now, drawing the consequences of this claim we can see the ex-
tent to which adopting a hermeneutical approach to populism can be 
fertile. It will be so because adopting an interpretative and emancipa-
tory approach to social reality, hermeneutics can contribute to identi-
fying the interests, and power-relations within a given society and pro-
vide a broad picture of the neoliberal status quo that led to the rise of 
populism; but also, with its value-laden interpretative analyses, dis-
cern among the many populist options which ones might be deemed 
acceptable. 
In other words, this is just a way to emphasize the critical aspect 
of hermeneutics. To a certain extent, critical hermeneutics, such as it 
has been highlighted by Ricoeur, Thompson (1981) and others, much 
like Critical Theory, is reminiscent of a Post-Kantian operation of dis-
tinction, of depuration, of separating the legitimate from the illegiti-
mate uses of a given faculty. With the difference here being that, within 
the context of hermeneutics, the result of critique is not only a negative 
demarcation and limitation of the domain of what can legitimately be 
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known, but rather the enlargement of what can actually be thinkable 
or feasible in action, through the process of what Ricoeur called the 
conflict of interpretations. That is, hermeneutics has at least as much 
to do with the multiplication of possibilities, the disclosing of realities, 
as it has with rejecting the wrong (political or theoretical) options 
through its evaluative capacities. 
With this description of a critical hermeneutics in mind, and with 
the indications already given as to the way in which it might apply to 
populism, let us now begin to delineate its tasks. In this, it shall be 
useful to compare it with its closest option, Critical Theory, especially 
as it was formulated in its first generation as a response to social 
events that were more catastrophic than what is happening in our own 
time. 
Let us be reminded that one of the first interdisciplinary tasks 
taken up by the Institut für Sozialforschung were the studies on au-
thority and family. The study of the influence of the authoritarian per-
sonality (Adorno et. al., 1950) and, later, of mass culture, were of the 
utmost significance for the Frankfurt school’s take on the rise of Nazism 
(see also Horkheimer, 1947). That we cannot grasp Nazism without 
understanding authoritarianism seems today obvious; but the Institut’s 
claim was more profound. As Martin Jay makes clear in his masterful 
reconstruction of the early years of the Frankfurt School: ‘one of the 
key elements in the Institut's interpretation of Nazism was the belief 
that the phenomenon [of authoritarianism] could not be isolated from 
general trends in Western civilization as a whole’ (Jay, 1974: 134). 
Jay recalls that there were two different approaches to Nazism 
within early Critical Theory: one closer to a more orthodox Marxism, 
focusing on the changes in legal, political and economic institutions 
that made Nazism possible, and whose representatives were figures 
like Neumann, Gurland and Kirchheimer; the other, composed of a 
number of authors around Horkheimer, emphasized less the economic 
Gonçalo Marcelo, Toward a Critical Hermeneutics of Populism 
72 
structure and ‘paid increased attention to technological rationalization 
as an institutional force and instrumental rationality as a cultural im-
perative’ (166). This latter strand was far more interested than the 
former in the ‘psychosocial mechanisms of obedience and sources of 
violence’ (Ib.) and acknowledged advanced capitalism’s resistance to 
the collapse that was predicted by Marx, which led to some skepticism 
concerning the possibilities for change (Ib.). It was this tendency that 
became prevalent within the Institute, and that in later years led to the 
analysis of mass culture and its aesthetical critique. 
Now, why is this historical reminder important? Because there are 
some parallelisms between our current political situation and the late 
1930s in Europe. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that the sit-
uation is the same. But as Michaël Foessel (2019) has recently argued, 
public discourse and popular sentiments today eerily echo, at least par-
tially, those of 1938, in that today we see, like before, populist attacks 
on the judicial system and liberal democracy, a longing for more au-
thority, a rise in nationalisms, and so forth. In other words, as Foessel 
argues, the logic of today’s political movements is somehow similar to 
those of 1938. 
Another striking similarity is the use of propaganda through new 
technological means. In the 1930s Goebbels and Hitler relied on the 
power of the radio to bypass traditional mediations and directly reach 
the people with their inflamed rhetoric. Today the so-called Nationalist 
International, under the tutelage of Steve Bannon and others, relies on 
fake news, fake profiles in social media and the creation of myths 
around their targets (e. g. the ‘Soros bogeyman’ theory) to manipulate 
their base and capture more and more voters disillusioned with glob-
alism. Should these populist-nationalist leaders gain the upper hand 
throughout Europe, chances are that they would use these new tech-
nological means for social control, finding new ways to gather data on 
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their peoples, curtail basic freedoms and eventually eradicating plural-
ism within the frontiers of Europe.  
Ultimately, we could be looking at the prospect of a much more 
monolithic Europe: hostile to cultural, religious, racial or sexual differ-
ence, exerting a strong grip within its borders, and much more closed 
off to those coming from outside. So what should we do? This paper 
does not delve on the aspects of citizen or political mobilization, even 
though they will of course be instrumental to change this course of 
events. Its main aim is just to sketch, from the side of theory, what 
could a ‘Critical Hermeneutics of populism’ contribute to what is 
needed. With this context as a backdrop, allow me to outline a few 
tasks ahead of us: 
First, a critical hermeneutics of populism must comprehend the 
causes of populism. As I contented in the first part of the paper, there 
are significant differences between the several populist phenomena. As 
a result, some of the causes of populism might be widely shared, while 
other populist phenomena will certainly exhibit rather unique traits and 
causes. As a consequence, this critical hermeneutical task will be two-
fold: 1.1) to understand the social psychology behind right-wing pop-
ulism, much like the Frankfurt School tried to understand the authori-
tarianism at the root of Nazism and, later, the mechanisms of domina-
tion underlying mass culture; and 1.2) to make a historical-hermeneu-
tical reconstruction of the way in which different societies and commu-
nities have been affected in the last decades by the economic crisis, 
the democratic legitimation crisis, or other problems that might have 
broken down their traditional party system and led to a surge in pop-
ulism. 
Both aspects of this twofold first task could be seen as looking to 
attain a deep understanding of these social phenomena and, given the 
thick dimension of hermeneutics in which emancipatory values are also 
embedded, as we have seen with Vattimo and Zabala (2011), they 
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would also, to some extent, aim to apply a therapeutic model to these 
social ills, at least if we consider right-wing populism as a ‘social pa-
thology’ (Marcelo, 2018). However, this task has one important caveat 
that must be mentioned. 
Hermeneutics is historical-comprehensive and emancipatory. But 
one should not overemphasize the role of the critical theorist or, in this 
case, the critical hermeneutician in this. What I mean is this: critical 
hermeneutics should be wary of any ‘epistemological break’ between 
the ‘theorist’ and ‘the people’ / ‘the masses’. Let us not forget that 
hermeneutics is not, and does not pretend to be ‘objective’ science. As 
such, and much like in French pragmatic sociology, what is at stake in 
this task is what Ricoeur would perhaps call the right mix between 
hermeneutics as a recollection of meaning and hermeneutics as the 
exercise of suspicion (Ricoeur, 1970). 
Allow me to unpack this last statement. Every diagnosis of a con-
cealed meaning or every denunciation of domination through manipu-
lation involves the exercise of some sort of suspicion, because what is 
at stake there is a distance between patent meaning and latent mean-
ing; and this is why, as Ricoeur noted, we need hermeneutics as an art 
of interpretation, in order to decipher patent meaning and find what is 
latent in it (Ricoeur, 1970). However, the wager of hermeneutics, at 
least as it appeared in Ricoeur, inspired French pragmatic sociologists 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; see also Michel, 2012), and is an epis-
temological position very close to third-generations Critical theorists 
like Axel Honneth, is that social actors are not dumb puppets who need 
the social critic to come fully explain the world to them and come lib-
erate them from the ills that the critic denounces. 
This latter position is some sort of theoretical elitism which is not 
only self-serving but that actually fuels anti-intellectualism and resent-
ment. This discussion is of course complex and wide-reaching as it 
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touches not only on the social role of theorists (including Critical theo-
rists) but also on the foundational or anti-foundational theoretical 
stances that underpin the theories of society that are put forward. But 
it is true that there is a tendency that runs from Lukács to the first 
generation of Critical theory or to ‘critical sociology’ deriving, from in-
stance, from Bourdieu (not to mention Althusser, who theorized the 
‘epistemological break’ allegedly stemming from Marx’s Capital in the 
first place) to institute this epistemological schism between those who 
would see the ‘real’ society or master the ‘real’ social science, and 
those who would need their help to see it. 
And then these theorists are surprised when the ‘Proletariat’ does 
not really embody ‘universal’ interests and bring about the revolution, 
when it is allegedly ‘bought’ by the social Welfare states and acquiesces 
to capitalism, or when social movements tend to be rather inorganic 
and not driven by theory or instituted party systems. So what we need 
to acknowledge is a somewhat democratic distribution of rationality 
and the ability to grasp meaning. In a way, Ricoeurian hermeneutics 
gives us that ability. At the same time, this is not to say that social 
actors are entirely rational, as neoclassical economics, and namely ra-
tional choice theory would have it. Things are far more complicated. 
Affects play a role in motivation too, as does their ideological manipu-
lation, for instance within the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2007). So people are neither entirely rational (nor is ration-
ality the merely instrumental capacity it is sometimes taken to be) nor 
entirely irrational (and, as I mentioned above, rejecting the constitu-
encies who votes for right-wing populists as being made up of ‘deplor-
ables’ or dumb, irrational people, only adds to the problem). 
Instead, we have zones of opacity within us, and we are prone to 
being seduced and manipulated, but also capable of resisting and 
grasping meaning. A critical hermeneutics of populism needs to take 
stock of this complexity, and, through education and interpretation, 
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help to provide people with the tools to identify their problems and 
reject the false and simplistic solutions that right-wing populists offer 
them.  
Second, a critical hermeneutics of populism will have to rely on 
one particular instance of traditional, Gadamerian hermeneutics: the 
fusion of horizons, at least when what is at stake is fostering relation-
ships of mutual recognition. Hermeneutics is not all about the fusion of 
horizons, just as politics is way more than consensus building. But 
something akin to a fusion of horizons is important for mutual under-
standing, for the welcoming of the standpoint of others, to see oneself 
as another and treat the others as selves equal in worth and deserving 
of esteem and respect. This much is upheld by Charles Taylor (1994) 
when he grounds his vision of multiculturalism in the fusion of horizons. 
Making a place for it is not tantamount to denying the agonistic trait of 
the political; but it is acknowledging that within the struggle that 
traverses our societies, space must be made for what Ricoeur (2005) 
called the ‘clearings’ of recognition. 
This is something particularly important when what is a stake is 
the absolute other, the one who is not a proper subject of rights be-
cause he or she is foreign to a given polity. Within their logic of antag-
onism and multiplication of enemies, right-wing populists tend to make 
the refugees, asylum seekers and migrants an easy target, a scapegoat 
for all economic woes and social malaises. Their problem thus becomes 
a matter of misrepresentation because they will often be left without a 
voice. A true politics of recognition and hospitality must thus rely on 
the wager of overcoming hostility through mutual understanding. Rich-
ard Kearney (in Marcelo, 2017) depicts it as the passage from the im-
possible to the possible, from hostility to hospitality, and proposes to 
operate this mediation through narrative imagination. It is through the 
exchange of narratives that this might be accomplished – which is in 
itself a hermeneutical act. 
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Third, when thought of in more general terms, applied not only to 
the fusion of horizons within the relationships of mutual recognition we 
have to engage in with those who are the most foreign to us, but to 
the entirety of relations between social groups and political actors 
within the same polity, the task of a critical hermeneutics of populism 
extends to involve something we already invoked with Mouffe: how to 
reconcile the agonism intrinsic to the political logic with the necessary 
respect for pluralism. This is one of the key distinctions that allows us 
to separate between legitimate and illegitimate populism, i.e., the pop-
ulist forms that jeopardize liberal democracies, and those that do not. 
Fourth, as I already hinted at – and this being something that 
follows as a consequence from the three other tasks –, a critical her-
meneutics of populism must be able to pinpoint the political proposals 
that are able to renew and reinvigorate democracy and popular partic-
ipation and welcome and foster them as a way to tackle the legitima-
tion deficit of representative democracy, while it must denounce and 
reject the populism that squashes pluralism and liberal democracy. And 
this can only be done by hermeneutically analyzing political proposals, 
discourses and actions. And in when this comes down to political com-
munication, this distinction will only come by through education and 
the exercise of critique – again, not by putting the critic in a pedestal, 
but by helping people to forge the tools they need to arrive themselves 
at these conclusions. 
It goes without saying that this is a tentative and incomplete list 
of tasks for what is still only the sketch of a project. It seems to me, 
for the reasons explained above, that a Critical Hermeneutics can be 
well suited to tackle populism. And if critical hermeneuticians are able 
to fulfill, even if only partially, these tasks, then their contribution to 
saving and renewing liberal democracy would already have been pre-
cious. 
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In the next and brief section of the paper, I present a summarized 
outline of what has been dubbed a ‘leftwing populism’ by Chantal 
Mouffe, in order to show the differences between this proposal and 
rightwing populism.  
 
4. Leftwing Populism: a reappraisal  
I have been claiming not that all populist forms are alike and that ra-
ther than asking whether certain political proposal is populist and dis-
crediting it if the answer is affirmative, we should do well to assess the 
problems it aims to solve and the values it holds.  
Chantal Mouffe claims that due to the disillusionment brought 
about by mainstream politics we are living in a populist moment and 
that, as a consequence, in the next few years, the main locus of polit-
ical struggle will be between right-wing populism and left-wing popu-
lism. (Mouffe, 2018: 21) As a consequence, she believes, the only way 
to prevent the coming of authoritarian solutions will be to reaffirm and 
expand democratic values through the construction of a new, progres-
sive hegemony. This new hegemony would be inclusive, even though, 
playing a part in the agonistic process, it would still have an adversary:  
 
Left populism wants to recover democracy to deepen and ex-
tend it. A left populist strategy aims at federating the demo-
cratic demands into a collective will to construct a ‘we’, a 
‘people’ confronting a common adversary: the oligarchy. This 
requires the establishment of a chain of equivalence among 
the demands of the workers, the immigrants and the precar-
ious middle class, as well as other democratic demands, such 
as those of the LGBT community (50). 
 
It is noteworthy that Mouffe believes that even though this new, 
inclusive democratic hegemony, necessitates a transformation in the 
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relations of power and a creation of new democratic practices (69), it 
does not require a revolutionary break with the liberal-democratic re-
gime (70). That is, a new hegemony could be built within the same 
institutional framework; which is to say, might we add, that what are 
needed are new interpretations of the democratic ideal, rather than a 
complete destruction of the current institutional framework and ways 
of living. Mouffe believes it still necessary to define an adversary (in 
this case, the oligarchy) and to build a ‘hegemonic offensive’, because 
without it no real change will ever happen. The question then becomes 
how do populists treat such an adversary. 
Indeed, the line between agonism and antagonism is fine. Insofar 
as left populism still draws a frontier and builds a hegemony, can it not 
also be exclusionary? In order to prevent it from being so, this agonism 
must be handled with care. One way to argue that it is not necessarily 
exclusionary resides in the fact that these conflicts we are alluding to 
are still, in a way, conflicts of interpretations. And insofar as the ‘oli-
garchy’ is actually an impediment to a democracy in which everyone 
really counts (not only in the formal procedure of voting) promoting a 
more equal distribution of power as a result of a progressive hegemony 
might actually be a sine qua non for a more fulfilled democracy. 
Another possible problem facing left populism is its reliability on 
the charismatic leader. This is a striking feature of any form of popu-
lism: its use of affects that somehow are channeled through charisma. 
And there is an intrinsic tension between this feature and Mouffe’s re-
liance in the current institutional framework. Allow me to unpack this 
diagnosis. 
In a way, even though she does not explicitly acknowledge it, 
Mouffe’s project is critical hermeneutical, insofar as in her attempt to 
spell out this sort of ‘radical reformism’ (88) what she is doing is trying 
to put some flesh in the bones of the very ethico-political principles of 
the liberal-democratic regime –  ‘liberty and equality for all’ (77) – 
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through ‘an immanent critique that mobilizes the symbolic resources 
of the democratic tradition’ (78). 
In other words: Mouffe just wants to recover values that we al-
ready adhere to in our democracies and to reinstate them in a more 
fulfilled manner. What she is aiming at is a reinterpretation of our 
founding (Ricoeur would call them ideological in a constitutive sense) 
values, within our current institutional framework, but with new prac-
tices and through a defeat of the ideology (neoliberalism) that made 
us forego or squash these same old values. And another key aspect is 
that she emphasizes the way in which ‘political parties provide discur-
sive frameworks that allow people to make sense of the social world’ 
(105). That is, as is now clear, Mouffe’s strategy of a left populism is 
hermeneutic through and through. 
However, for all her reliance in our founding values and current 
institutions, there is an implicit (albeit not always emphasized) reliance 
on the charismatic leader. And this has its limitations. It can be argued 
that the same progressive strategy that is being put forward here can 
be born within institutions themselves or, more likely, in a more hori-
zontal manner through social movements and using modes of commu-
nication that are more democratic and less centered on the figure of a 
leader. Otherwise it runs the risk of putting its faith on political solu-
tions which might be devoid of meaning without the charismatic lead-
ers that once led them. And if so, then left populism would not be very 
far from rightwing populism after all. 
But it can be. Mouffe makes clear that her theory has no specific 
program or regime in mind (97). That is, the deepening of democracy 
she aspires to could assume the forms of democratic socialism, eco-
socialism, associative democracy, participatory democracy (Ib.) or 
other forms, according to specific contexts. Rather, her goal is to get 
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more representation for the people: ‘The remedy does not lie in abol-
ishing representation but in making our institutions more representa-
tive. This is indeed the objective of a left populist strategy’ (105). 
We could then say that there is some intrinsic indeterminacy or 
vagueness in this proposal, but this has necessarily to remain so; oth-
erwise the theory on left populism would really amount to no more 
than a political program. The goal is rather to inspire the political pro-
jects that can bring about more freedom, equality and democratic rep-
resentation. Mouffe tries to re-signify populism in order to show in 
which manner it could recover democracy. And this, we could say, is 
also precisely another task for a critical hermeneutics of populism. 
 
5. Conclusion 
When successful and carried out to its ultimate consequences, a new 
and better interpretation of the social world can change it. It remains 
to be seen whether a ‘left populist’ attempt at hegemony will succeed 
in tackling both neoliberalism and rightwing populism and bringing 
about a more democratic, free and equal society. Part of the task at 
hand is, of course, hermeneutical. Such an effort would have to defeat 
both the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ and the resurgence of the exclusion-
ary forces. 
This new symbolic order would partially recover already-existing 
ideals but endowing them with new interpretations leading to new 
practices. Will this ever happen? That much cannot be affirmed with 
any degree of certainty. But the interpretative and emancipatory po-
tential of a critical hermeneutics of populism could, and should, help in 
the task of identifying both the perils and possibilities of the current 
political landscape. And perhaps also contribute, with its critical capac-
ity of distinction, to provide the tools allowing people to instantiate 
their will to live together and exercise their power-in-common through 
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the choice of the political options that better accommodate the found-
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